Intent to create legal relations
Intent to create legal relations is the first element in a contract. This is when two or more people are in agreement. The basic legal question is whether or not they regard themselves as being bound by that agreement. If the agreement is one based upon a social or domestic agreement the intention to create legal relations is missing.
Example:
Balfour vs. Balfour (1919).
In this case the defendant was a civil servant stationed in Ceylon. He and his wife were in England on leave. It became clear that she could not return with him abroad because of her health. She alleged that he had promised to pay her 30 pounds a month as maintenance during the time that they were forced to live apart. She sued for breach of this agreement.
The court held that she could not recover and she would not receive compensation as a consequence of her husband’s broken promise because the parties did not intend that the agreement should have legal consequences. It held that such agreements are not contracts, but rather a domestic agreement that has no legal force in a court of law.
(Greene, 2013)
Wakeling v Ripley (1951)
The defendant, a bachelor, resided alone in Sydney. The plaintiffs were his sister and her husband, a Cambridge University lecturer. In 1946, the defendant wrote to his sister to persuade her and her husband to come to live with him. He promised that he would leave them all his property upon his death and that, in the meantime, he would provide them with a home and a living. Considerable correspondence ensued and eventually the plaintiffs agreed. The husband resigned his lectureship, they sold their house and they came to live with the defendant. Just over a year later the parties quarreled, the defendant reneged on his promise, sold his house and disinherited the plaintiffs. They sued. At first instance they succeeded and were awarded £12000 damages. The defendant appealed, arguing (inter alia) that the agreement was purely social and thus unenforceable.
He failed. The voluminous correspondence and the seriousness of the move for the plaintiffs showed that the parties had intended their agreement to be binding. Consequently, it was binding and the defendant was liable for his unjustified breach.
The defendant, a bachelor, resided alone in Sydney. The plaintiffs were his sister and her husband, a Cambridge University lecturer. In 1946, the defendant wrote to his sister to persuade her and her husband to come to live with him. He promised that he would leave them all his property upon his death and that, in the meantime, he would provide them with a home and a living. Considerable correspondence ensued and eventually the plaintiffs agreed. The husband resigned his lectureship, they sold their house and they came to live with the defendant. Just over a year later the parties quarreled, the defendant reneged on his promise, sold his house and disinherited the plaintiffs. They sued. At first instance they succeeded and were awarded £12000 damages. The defendant appealed, arguing (inter alia) that the agreement was purely social and thus unenforceable.
He failed. The voluminous correspondence and the seriousness of the move for the plaintiffs showed that the parties had intended their agreement to be binding. Consequently, it was binding and the defendant was liable for his unjustified breach.